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Two decades since the war ended in Kosova1, difficulties, 
especially those of a political nature, worsened. The 
combination of local and international efforts have catalyzed 
and facilitated achieving the rule of law and interethnic 
reliability within the state of Kosovo, but not reconciliation. 
There are still to truths, an Albanian and a Serbian. Few of war 
criminals for Kosova’s crimes were sentenced. Hate speeches 
are again between. It appears that peace building is not as 
easily conceivable as initially thought, considering the lack of 
agreement between internal and international actors on the 
creation of a new state of Kosova. This article attempts to 
answer to what extent Kosovo’s peace building has been 
influenced by international ambiguity and wrongful decisions 
made by the Kosova’s institutions, highlighting the obstructive 
politics and agents such as political and socio-economic, 
interrupting inter-ethnic reconciliatory treatment toward 
sustainable peace in the Balkan region.  
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Kosova’s state building is a mixed, international and local endeavor. The 
task appeared to be complex and problematic because of different views 
held by world states and indigenous challenges. The country seems to be 
the most turbulent in the Balkans, followed by Bosnia, Macedonia, Monte 
Negro, Serbia and Albania.2 Based on their levels of domestic stability and 
institutional capacity, Kosova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia 
are all placed within the “warning” category,3 a state which is worsening 
the European stability. 
 Deep distrust and century old mutual stereotypes between Kosova and 
Serbia are still barriers to a process of reconciliation. Overcoming deep-
rooted differences are the most problematic elements in the conflict 
resolution process and not achievable alongside the international 
community involvement. The very beginning of 21 century produced 
antagonistic situation between international players in relation with 
Kosovo and its perspective.4 After twenty years of peace building efforts, a 
resolution in part of the Kosova-Serbia dispute seems to have an unlikely 
solution in the immediate future. In this situation, Serbia is hampering 
Kosova’s progress in the path toward international organization 
membership. Political elite from both sides are often returning at the 
warlike vocabulary of the 90’s, inhibiting peacebuilding measures taken 
nationally and internationally during the last two decades in the region. 
Different political objectives between Kosova and Serbia regarding the 
political status of Kosova are impeding the process of regional stability. 
Lack of political will to apologize, or at least to help finding human mortal 
remains5 has undoubtedly hindered the peaceful prosperity of both 
                                                 
2 Global Peace Index, 2018, available at: < http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-
peace-index/ > (accessed 04 December 2018). 
3 The Failed State Index, 2010, Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2011, available at: 
<www.fundforpeace.org. > (accessed 04 December 2018). 
4 Since 2013, Kosova and Serbia, under supervision by EU are holding negotiations related 
to several technical issues, most of them approved but not implemented in real life. 
Currently is underground the subject of “territorial correction” as proposal for resolving the 
conflict. According to Kosova President, Hashim Thaçi, it includes unification of south 
Serbian territories inhabited by Albanians to Republic of Kosova. 
5 According to ICRC, Today, the number of missing persons is estimated to be over 1,665 
persons, at International Commission on Missing Persons, Missing Persons from the Kosovo 
Conflict and its Aftermath: A Stocktaking, 2017, p.3. Available from:  
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countries. Even worse, there are incentives by Serbian official’s figures to 
minimize and distort the Serbian massacres in Kosovo classifying them as 
activities of Albanians'!6 
Difficult achievable set of procedures and criteria’s to be completed for 
membership by mainly international organizations will aggravate Kosovo's 
agony and will induce backwards towards peace building in the region.  
 
2. International context of Kosova’s independence 
 
The task, named as peace building, undertaken in Kosova by foreign 
and local stakeholders during the last twenty years was challenged with 
internal, regional and international difficulties. Building peace in cases 
oriented with the creation of the new international entity (or separation, as 
it is in Kosova’s case) is different in nature and more complex than in those 
of intrastate reconciliation between communities. The role of external 
involvement in the first situation (creation of the new state) seems to be 
crucial because of the role of the international community as a mediator in 
conflict resolution and for the recognition issue of new created ethnicity. In 
second circumstances, when conflict resolution is oriented towards 
rebuilding of breached interethnic relations and within the same state, 
reconciliation is easy to be achieved, especially if peace building is oriented 
to be locally owned. Statehood and national sovereignty restrictions, limits 
the Kosova’s capacity to negotiate or to enter into agreements with the EU 
and other international organizations. This discourages the readiness of 
foreign investors supporting economic growth. Limitation in this nature by 
the international community and unwillingness of Kosovas living Serbian 
population to accept Kosova’s statehood, are weakening and slowing 
institution and state building, serving as inhibitors of building peace in 
Kosova. After failure of Serbia’s acceptance of negotiated Ahtisaari’s plan, 
which provided Kosova’s temporary supervised independence, Kosova 
                                                                                                                            
https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kosovo-stocktaking-ENG.pdf 
(accessed 05 December 2018).  
6 Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj sacked the Serb Minister of Local Government 
Administration, Ivan Teodosijevic, for describing ethnic Albanians as terrorists and 
fabricators of massacres during the war in Kosovo. 9 April 2019. At Die Morina, Kosovo 
Serb Minister Fired for Calling Albanians ‘Terrorists’, Available from: 
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/04/09/kosovo-serb-minister-fired-for-calling-albanians-
terrorists/ (accessed 12 April 2019). 
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unilaterally declared independence in 2008. Serbia, on 15 August 2008, six 
months after Kosova’s independence declaration, recognized by 45 
countries7, reacted asking an opinion from the International Court of 
Justice, ICJ.8 Given opinion by ICJ on July 22, 2010, with 10 votes in favor 
and 4 against that: “The approval of the Declaration of Independence on 17 
February 2008, does not violate the general international law, Resolution 
1244 (1999) of the Security Council, and the Constitutional Framework. 
Consequently, the approval of this Statement shall not affect any applicable 
norm of international law”, was and continue to be a good milestone for 
recognition by states. Answer by ICJ didn’t satisfied Serbia’s expectations. 
Not surprisingly, this opinion did not change Serbian policy orientation 
considering Kosovo as part of her, and intensified anti-Kosovo activities at 
foreign plan. Aggressive diplomatic behavior of Russia and China’s 
diplomacy against Kosova’s achievements at international scene, and 
unrecognizing policy of five EU countries, challenged with inner 
separatism, openly are opposing Kosovo’s path toward integration within 
different levels of international organizations. Belgrade’s foreign policy 
objective in this direction, preventing Kosova inclusion at international 
organization and freezing Kosova’s status, succeeded.  
Twenty years after humanitarian military intervention and a decade 
after declaration of independence Kosova is being faced with economic, 
political and integration difficulties. 
Even the fact that international community took immediate measures 
providing shelter and establishing secure environment in Kosova, as 
Brinkerhoff identified,9 EU member states did not act concertedly as did 
not act UN SC, in direction of future perceptions about final status of 
Kosova. Currently, in Kosova and the region, with respective scarcity of 
political unity and without promising economic dynamics, the hopes for 
peace building are deteriorating. Young population is escaping from 
                                                 
7 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: < http://www.mfa-ks.net/politika/484/lista-
e-njohjeve/484 > (accessed 04 December 2018).  
8 The question made by Serbia was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?” available at: < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf. > (accessed 04 
December 2018). 
9 Dealing with the police, military and paramilitary units, through rebuilding, 
professionalizing, reforming, dissolving, demobilization,… Derick W. Brinkerhoff. 
“Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: core concepts and cross-
cutting themes”, 2005, 25: 1, Public Administration & Development, p. 6. 
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Kosova, hoping for job and better life. Hopes on the talks are getting more 
and more faded because of Serbian intentions on dividing Kosova, backed 
by Russia, backing a resolution of Serbia’s dispute with Kosovo which suit 
Belgrade.10  
In Kosovo case, where state building is contested internationally in 
political basis and to some degree internally, by 5 % of Kosova population 
backed by Serbia, society can be easily channeled in prewar situation, 
meaning recurrence at point zero. “Renewed conflicts will be generated if 
domestic turmoil with ethnic dimensions becomes increasingly 
interconnected among neighboring countries.”11 
Almost twenty years after the war in Kosova, the country remains 
underdeveloped far behind others in the region, the situation which may 
reflect in the use of violent choices by individuals and groups, based in 
ethnicity and faith. Neither side from the actors involved in the war dealt 
with the sources of mistrust and hates between Albanians and the Serbs. 
Additionally, both sides are enforcing their “rights” of fighting for their 
cause. There are still two “rights”, and no one side gives up. Serbian side, 
related to Kosova’s human losses, abuses, and other damages, doesn’t 
make any difference on the responsibility between the Albanians and the 
Milosević’s government, justifying that now is a new era for the Serbian 
democracy and new Albanian/Serbian relations must be established within 
Serbian State. Even more, within the current interethnic hostile climate, 
fiery political attitudes kill intentions on improving positive intergroup 
relations. The Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, visiting Kosova in 2018, 
he had opportunity to serve as moderate leader. On contrary, he provoked 
not only Kosova Albanians but the entire democratic world saying that 
Slobodan Milosević was “a great leader with the best intentions…”12, for 
                                                 
10 AFP News Agency, (2018) Lavrov backs Iranian deal, swipes at Ukraine and Kosovo, 28 
September, Lavrov said: Moscow would support a resolution of Serbia’s dispute with 
Kosovo which suit Belgrade. available at: < https://www.rferl.org/a/unga-russia-us-iran-
kosovo-ukraine/29515438.html > (accessed 11 October 2018). 
11 Janusz Bugajski (2013), Return of Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and U.S. 
Disengagement, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. P.4. 
12 Dusan Stojanovic, Serbian president’s praise of Milosevic triggers outrage, Washington 
Post, 10 September 2018, “Milosevic was a great Serbian leader whose intentions were 
certainly for the best, but our results were very poor,… Not because he wanted that, but 
because our wishes were unrealistic, while we neglected and underestimated the interests 
and aspirations of other nations.” available at: 
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the leader who sowed misery and death everywhere in the territory of 
Yugoslavia killing tens of thousand people. Promoting ideas and 
ideologies, glorification of aborted personalities and leaders, is sign that 
nowadays Serbian leaders are prone to repeating history.13 Paradoxically, 
twenty years after war, the same war leaders are current leaders. There is a 
big question, is possible that the leaders of the war will change the 
situation, will bring peace? Serbian politics and diplomacy, supported by 
countries with ethnic disturbances and deficit of democracy, are damaging 
the prospect of the absolute majority of Kosovar citizens. On the other side, 
the Kosova Albanians, irreversibly continue state building and enhance 
activities for further recognitions of Kosova’s independence. Under Serbian 
regimes, historically inhabited with Albanian majority, Kosova has been 
left politically, culturally, and economically undeveloped with the clear 
goal to divert the Albanian majority from the territory.  With the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, Kosova Albanians found hope to be relieved from regimes that 
brought only suffers to them.  
 
3. “Mistrust” by the Kosova Serb officials vs Kosova institutions  
 
Many foreign factors are inhibiting reconciliation in Kosova: declining 
EU interest for enlargement with Balkan countries and no recognition 
policy by five EU member states; lack of foreign investments in Kosova; the 
inert attitude of the EU opens the gate for the growth of Russian influence 
in the region, particularly the rigid attitude against Kosova’s independence 
through the stance “for everything Serbia agrees it is acceptable for 
Russia”; different view by UNSC member on Kosova status at international 
stage; Serbian nationalistic posture over Kosova as “cradle of Serbia”, 
implementation unreadeness of the agreements by Serbia reached during 
negotiations in Brussels. But, the main foreign inhibitory factor for peace 
settlement in Kosova-Serbian relations is Serbian nationalistic stance on 
Kosova. Taking in account situation of mistrust and the extension of 
                                                                                                                            
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/serbian-presidents-praise-of-milosevic-
triggers-outrage/2018/09/10/ca258470-b503-11e8-ae4f-
2c1439c96d79_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.90fdf99c5905 > (accessed 04 October 
2018). 
13 Aleksandar Vučić, was appointed the Minister of Information in 1998, by the Government 
of National Unity from Serbian Radical Party, serving to Slobodan Milosević until his fall in 
2000. Ivica Dačić was the right hand of Millosević’s era. 
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disagreements, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, sponsored by 
the European Union and Serbia, launching the Kosova-Serbia dialogue and 
facilitated by the EU.14 The dialogue process, at the beginning praised in 
general as the biggest success and the peak of EU’s policy in the Western 
Balkans, was characterized with contradictions, lack of transparency and 
accountability and constructive ambiguity15. Expectations on finalization 
with a legally binding agreement between the parties, somewhere at the 
middle of 2019, are unrealistic taking into account the launched idea of 
border correction and possible complexities involved within the process. 
Besides the fact that Kosova minorities are granted positive discriminations 
on issue of participating in decision-making and daily life, according to the 
Kosova constitution and laws, these rights are used selectively by the 
Serbian population in Kosova. When it comes to hamper positive 
achievements and reputation of institutions, they undertake actions at the 
opposite direction. The best example is the case of involvement in (de) 
engagements of the Serbs from Kosova Security Forces, KSF. After initial 
successes in participation of the Serbs within this important institution, in 
order to minimize results, Serbian leaders from Belgrade launched and 
supported campaign to leave the organization by Kosova Serbian members 
of KSF. This campaign reflected combination of political threatening and 
physical attacks against KSF members and their property.16 "This situation 
puts Serbs in a totally inappropriate situation. On the one hand, they are 
pressured by Belgrade, with the threats they will imprison when leaving 
                                                 
14 United Nations General Assembly, (2010), “Resolution A/RES/64/298”, September 9. 
available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298 > (accessed 04 
December 2018). 
15 A method to suit the parties’ stance on the status of Kosovo, offered space for the parties 
to interpret the agreements according to their version and both sides announce their victory 
in negotiations. See at: Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue Challenges and the Way Forward, KDI, 
March 2018. p.14.  
16 At the end of November 2017, explosive devices were thrown at the houses of S.T. and P. 
R, in Zubin Potok, Serbian members of KSF. Bombs are thrown about two o'clock, no 
injured, but with material damage. At the end of February, Serbian members of the KSF in 
this municipality reached outright messages. April and May 2018, Serbian authorities also 
attracted Serbian members of Kosovo's security forces, or, as Belgrade claims, "talked with 
them". After the arrest, Prishtina expressed "bitterness and deep concern" and urged 
Belgrade to "leave the politics of detention and intimidation of Kosovo Serbs". At the end of 
May, the car was burned to another Serb member of KSF. Serbs have also received more 
calls for not accessing KSF, and a slightly different message has been reported in the public.  
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Kosova and, on the other hand, it is perfectly normal that there will be 
pressure from Kosova institutions, says Nojkić. "17 In this line is the 
statement by Kosova President saying that for members of KSF whom 
decided to leave from, they will not be returned again,18 putting their life in 
dangerous sandwich. It was not verbal pressure against only members of 
KSF. Several attacks occurred aiming to humiliate the Serbs whom accepted 
becoming members of Kosova institutions. "... The private property of 
Serbian members of the KSF in north Kosovo was repeatedly the target of 
the attacks by unknown perpetrators, and pressure invasion by central 
Serbia additionally terrorized them. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić 
also called on Kosova Serbs not to join the "Kosova institutions", because 
they (Albanians), "wants to hit the Serb on Serbs".19 Leader’s statements, 
such that by Serbian President do not contribute overcoming negative 
perceptions in Albanian-Serbian relations or aid in approaching a climate 
of positive peace which will bring political stability and interethnic 
relaxation. The Kosova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed anxiety 
about the repetition of such acts of the Belgrade authorities which, as the 
MFA considers, seem to be the primary goals of intimidation, increased 
pressure and use of lessons to prevent the integration of Kosova Serbs into 
the institutional and social life of the Republic of Kosova.20  
The same situation is at other sectors of the institutional building. 
Kosova Deputy Prime-minister and ministers from Serbian community are 
openly implementing instructions by Belgrade. Politicians form the Serbian 
community within Kosova’s Government and Assembly are often 
suspended or withdrawn from participation in decision-making bodies, by 
Kosova institutions. They are exposed to arbitrary actions taken by the 
                                                 
17 Nga marsi, Serbia ka shtuar dukshëm presionin mbi pjesëtarët serbë në FSK, (2018), Indeksonline, 
July 3 available at: < http://indeksonline.net/nga-marsi-serbia-ka-shtuar-dukshem-
presionin-mbi-pjesetaret-serbe-ne-fsk/> (accessed 06 Octomber 2018).  
18 Thaçi: Ata që janë larguar nga FSK-ja nuk mund të kthehen më, (2018),Telegrafi, July 13, 
available at: < https://telegrafi.com/thaci-ata-qe-jane-larguar-nga-fsk-ja-nuk-mund-te-
kthehen/ > (accessed 04 December 2018). 
19 Kosovske snage bezbednosti: Srpski pripadnici zatražili raskid ugovora zbog pritiska iz Srbije, 
(2018), KoSSev, available at: < https://kossev.info/vesti-s-kosova-kosovske-snage-
bezbednosti-srpski-pripadnici-traze-ostavke-zbog-pritiska-iz-srbije/ > (accessed 04 
December 2018). 
20 Dvojica srpskih pripadnika KSF-a pušteni na slobodu, (2018), KoSSev, available at: < 
https://kossev.info/dvojica-srpskih-pripadnika-kbs-a-pusteni-na-slobodu-2/ > (accessed 
04 December 2018). 
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Serbian policy at the border check points making travelling difficulties21. 
They quitted participation in Assembly and government after passing the 
law on Trepça.22 Members of the government cabinet by Serbian 
community suspended participation in the work of government,23 after the 
arrest of the Serbian official Marko Đurić by Kosovo Special Forces. Serbian 
official policy regarding the Kosova institutions, regularly use the term 
provisional or temporary institutions in Prishtina and for Kosova they use 
the name Kosovo and Metohija, as it is written in Serbian Constitution 
during the Milosevician era, undermining that the institutions of Kosova 
are provisional ones, and that Kosova will return within Serbia, 
continuously charging Albanians with negative predispositions against 
Serbia. It means that there are two elements that determine the slowdown 
in the integration of Serbs into Kosova's mechanisms: mistrust by the local 
Serbs towards Kosova’s institutions and political and security pressure by 
Serbian politics to Serb population willing to participate. Serbia finds it 
difficult to withdraw from the basis of hegemonies promoted loudly 
during the 1990s toward the policy of acceptation of losing Kosova. The 
politics of hate lead to the deportation of Albanians, causing international 
humanitarian intervention and creating the new reality in Kosova ground. 
New reality relocated the status of Kosova citizens where Serbs from the 
majority within former Yugoslavia transformed into a minority within 
Kosova, contrary with the Albanians whom became majority. After 
declaring the independence by Kosovo institutions, confirmations by The 
International Court of Justice that declaration did not breached the 
international law, after the Serbian request to give the ICJ opinion on the 
declaration of independence, Serbian government policy continuously 
ignored the situation in the ground and ICJ opinion. Serbian diplomacy is 
continuously undertaking actions against Kosovo’s recognition and 
lobbying to countries that recognized Kosova’s independence in order to 
                                                 
21 Kosovo Serb politicians stage protest at border crossing, The Serbian police detained SLS 
official Srdjan Jovanovic, an advisor to the prime minister of Kosovo, N1, 26.04.2019. 
http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a479390/Kosovo-Serb-politicians-stage-protest-at-
border-crossing.html 
22 Slucaj Trepca: Srpski ministri zamrzli učešće u Vladi u Prištini, (2016), Politika, available at: 
<https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/2482613/slucaj-trepca-srpski-ministri-zamrzli-
ucesce-u-vladi-u-pristini> (accessed 04 December 2018). 
23 Rakić: Srpska lista izlazi iz kosovske vlade, (2018), Danas Online, available at: 
<https://www.danas.rs/politika/rakic-srpska-lista-izlazi-iz-kosovske-vlade/> (accessed 04 
December 2018). 
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reverse their decisions.24 According to the Serbian information’s,25 six 
countries withdrew their recognition of Kosova: Liberia, Surinam, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Guinea Bissau, Burundi and Papua Nova Guinea. 
Activities and extreme Serbian propaganda against independence of 
Kosova and obstruction of new recognitions looks like throwing oil into the 
fire of the climate of mistrust, pushing away further damaging any possible 
reconciliation between two countries.  
Following a regional paternalistic policy, similar to that of Russia in 
national affairs and minority care outside their territories, Serbia turns 
things back in the prewar years. Russia's “care” in Ossetia, Nagorno 
Karabagh, Ukraine (Crimea and the south-eastern part of Ukraine) ... is 
similar to those of Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosova, Montenegro, 
and Macedonia. This policy aims at uniting the Serbs into a single state but 
denies the other to take a more active role in determining their own 
destinies and participating in the regional political and economic relations. 
Changing the imperialistic character of Serbia into realistic attitude toward 
the neighbors will be a great contribution to sustainable peace in the region. 
In the current situation, it’s a “war” between the future coexistence of two-
state solution: the mutual recognition between Kosova and Serbia, and 
tendencies of returning at the beginning, at pre-war situation, saving any 
linkage of Kosova with Serbian state. Mistrust toward Kosova institutions 
by Kosova Serbs is result of political and physical pressure coming from 
Serbia’s nationalist wing and, often, by Serbian leaders daily policy toward 
Kosova. 
 
4. Mismanaged with Kosova’s Institutions  
 
Transition period during the 90’s found Kosova at worst environment: 
Wars in former Yugoslav republics; Serbian nationalist instinct for 
dominance within Yugoslav space; systemic, police and administrative 
                                                 
24 The dialogue challenged unexpected situations, as the engagement of the Serb diplomacy 
against recognition of the state of Kosovo, activities against Kosova membership in 
international organizations (UNESCO and INTERPOL), problems with the wall in front of 
the bridge in Mitrovica, Ramush Haradinaj prohibition by French authorities based on a 
warrant issued by Serbia. 
25 Papua Nova Gvineja šesta zemlja koja je povukla priznanje Kosova, (2018), RTS, 5 Jul, 
available at: 
<http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/3191550/papua-nova-gvineja-sesta-
zemlja-koja-povlaci-priznanje-kosova.html > (accessed 04 December 2018).  
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treatment measures against Kosova’s population; worse economic 
situation; and, finally, escalation of war during 1998/99 were circumstances 
that put Kosovo in miserable situation. After the war, in every aspect, 
Kosovo started from the beginning. New type of governance, new 
administration and financing procedures, the life without thousands of 
people murdered, new psycho-social behavior, challenges with bad 
economic situation and depending mostly by international help. In postwar 
Kosova, didn’t happened prioritization of good governance “as a key 
requirement in order to address high levels of corruption and 
unaccountable practices, unequal distribution of resources, and social 
division”.26 Formeralted with “the victory”, thousand “commanders” and 
political leaders appeared and started creating their “circles” of dominance 
over public property and other fields of life. Today they become oligarchs, 
controlling political parties and organizations. Rather than dealing with 
strengthening the country institutions, believing that Kosova is liberated, 
those people, seizing the state and often private property, captured the key 
financing routes and incomes including green economy and trade, 
enriching themselves and their relatives, damaged the overall country 
perspective. Respectable international findings reports on a “legacy of 
strong formerecutive influence in judiciary ... and problems with crime and 
high-level corruption”.27 Nepotism but not meritocracy and qualified were 
taken in consideration for state position functions. Internationals overcome 
quietly this behavior hoping that this way will pacify the situation. As 
result, Kosova today remains with the highest number of unemployment, 
the poorest country in Europe, the only isolated country in Europe,28 within 
                                                 
26 B. C. Smith (2007), “Good Governance and Development”, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 
p.6. 
27 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Commission and others, 
during 2012 reported on Kosovo’s challenges. available at: < Independence of the Judiciary 
in Kosovo: Institutional and Functional Dimensions, 2012. p. 25. available at: < 
https://www.osce.org/kosovo/87138?download=true> (accessed 14 December 2018), 
referred to Monthly Report – July 2007, THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DECENTRALIZATION, AND COMMUNITIES Legal System Monitoring Section. P.3. 
available at: < https://www.osce.org/kosovo/26468?download=true> (accessed 14 
December 2018). 
28 During writing the article, there is information from EU official Dimitris Avramopoulos 
that Kosova fulfilled visa liberation criteria. Erdhi lajmi i shumëpritur, Kosova i ka plotësuar 
kriteret për liberalizim vizash,(2018), available at:  
< https://www.koha.net/arberi/105815/erdhi-lajmi-i-shumepritur-kosova-i-ka-plotesuar-
kriteret-per-liberalizim-vizash/ 
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rare countries without health and life insurance, people willing to leave the 
country and emigrate around…resulting at low level of trust toward 
Kosovo leaders and institutions.29 Over 50% of respondents are either 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the current political and economic 
direction of Kosova. Satisfactions with central levels of institutions are 
between 30 and 40%. Formerpectations for producing any positive incomes 
for families and businesses are les than 20%.30 In this situation, it is 
problematic to achieve best results in peacebuilding if population mistrust 
in institutions and leaders is fewer than 50%. Such people, corrupted 
leaders state capturers, do not want and can not achieve integration steps 
towards Europe, being part of rule of law environment. International and 
local efforts in Kosovo, despite the fact that there were invested in per 
capita more than elsewhere in the world, however, did not achieve to 
create fair and just governance satisfying people needs31. Political elite and 
their corrupted clienteles are everywhere, at decision-making positions at 
all levels of governance creating benefits for the class and ideology, 
accommodating elites rather than communities. This situation limits 
freedoms, as Freedom House range Kosovo as “partially free country”, 
which increases tendencies toward high levels of corruption.32 The 
precondition of country stability as is the absence of ethnic confrontation in 
Kosovo has been achieved, however others, such as conflict resolution and 
economic development are ongoing. Twenty years after the withdrawal of 
Serbian forces from Kosova, formeristence and influence of Kosovar, 
Serbian and international political authorities appeared to be the main 
producers of the status quo. Within Kosova’s territory are still in function 
the Serbian parallel systems in field of education, health, 
administration…Political parties are running based on ethnicity. The 
                                                 
29 Erëza Pula (2017), “Determinants of Trust in Institutions in Kosovo: An empirical 
perspective”, Group for Legal and Political Studies, October, available at: 
<http://www.legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Policy-Report-04-
Trust-in-Institutions.pdf 
30 Public Pulse Brief, XIV, (2018), UNDP, June, p. 4.  
31 Azar E. Edward (1990), The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Case, 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, London, at p. 11. wrote that: “fair and just governance 
that would be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity cleavages, 
and promote communal harmony and social stability”. 
32 Kaufman correlate civil freedoms and corruption as disproportional, countries with low 
levels of freedom have high levels of corruption. See at, Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: 
A Sourcebook (2002), World Bank 1 May, at p. 3.  
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divisions are a result of different formerpectations from Kosova-Serbian 
dialogue that is going on. Above mentioned practices of managing citizen’s 
daily life in Kosova, influenced on obstruction of social emancipation and 
creating preconditions for peace. 
 
5. Kosova as a victim of the different views at international law 
 
It is difficult to achieve peace in a territory when interests within the 
main decision-maker bodies are antagonistic one and in situation of 
formeristence the three political authorities. The Kosovo case is a typical 
formerample of disagreement between the two most important 
international bodies to whom Kosova claim to be member: between UN SC 
member states and members of EU. Russia and China’s interpretation of 
international law on Kosovo independence is contradictory to the USA, 
Great Britain, and France, whom recognized Kosova as independent and 
sovereign state. Contradictions appeared also between EU member states, 
creating headache to Kosova’s integration and human, economic and 
democratic development. Viewing pro’s and contra’s state statements on 
Kosova independence declaration, there are two mainly reasons taken by 
state governments on the issue: first, systematic violation of the rights for 
Albanians under Serbian rule, and second, unilateral independence 
declaration is in contradiction with the international law. How it is possible 
that one international contformert is differently interpreted by different 
actors? Reason is political, not juridical nature. Formercept Kosova Forces, 
KFOR, civilian international missions have performed not as this 
community and locals formerpected. UN mission in Kosova, UNMIK, 
aiming to lay the foundation of future peace, did good job in institution 
building but did not walk with the will of Kosova citizens and institutions 
because of restrictions by UN SC Resolution 1244. This resolution didn’t 
have a clear mandate and leaved unresolved basic cause of the conflict, the 
Kosovo's final status, which is the foundation of conflict resolution but also 
my return society at the early stage of conflict. It happened even after the 
UN Special Envoy; President Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) was approved by Kosova and international 
community, which provided supervised independence. The same UN SC 
Resolution is in place and is the main obstacle to Kosova membership at 
UN. Within the UN SC permanent members are of differing opinions 
related to Kosova’s status. This attitude deepens freezing the conflict. At 
Dr.Sc. Samet DALIPI 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 9, No 1 (2019) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
132 
regional level, minority EU not recognizing members are doing the same as 
are doing Russia and China at global level. In this circumstance proclaimed 
Kosovo independence, recognized by 116 countries, is not fully 
functionalized. Rests of unrecognizing countries are in formerpectation of 
the results by ongoing dialogue between parts in conflict. Delays and 
uncertainties will further endanger interethnic relations and melting 
Kosova’s Albanians patience. “The time has come for clarity and alacrity.”33 
Ahtisaari’s Plan provides appropriate framework to allow normalization of 
life in Kosova through the liberal peace-building paradigm, meaning 
transformation to peace, democracy and market economy. Implementation 
of the Plan faced difficulties because of involvement by main factors of 
international politics and complformerities coming from the area of legality 
of creation the new states. This is because of formeristent different 
approaches towards international law adopted for inner or shared group 
states interests.34 To some of them, western democracies and Japan, 
Australia,…Kosova’s independence is result of brutal, inhuman behavior 
by Serbian regimes against Albanians in Kosova. To others, Russia, China, 
India and countries that are faced with interethnic disputes and separatist 
tendencies, accuse the rest of the world that illegally recognized Kosova’s 
independence, breaching the international order, beside the fact that ICJ 
opinion on the issue stated contrary. Accidentally, in the same line with 
Russia and China are also policies by five EU member states35 that are 
blocking Kosova’s EU integration. Domestic policy of the five EU member 
states, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece, condemning 
Kosova’s independency are correlated with Russian and China‘s own 
ethnic, separatism and territorial problems, fearing unreasonably that 
Kosova case would interfere as possible precedence to their cases.  
                                                 
33 Daniel Serwer; Yll Bajraktari; Christina Parajon (2007), Kosovo: What Can Go Wrong? 
available at:  
< https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/03/kosovo-what-can-go-wrong> (accessed 19 
December 2018). 
34 Samet Dalipi, Nehat Demiri, Arta Pllana-Shipoli (2016), Not-recognizing policy within the 
minority EU members - Challenge for Kosovo’s Integration and Regional Peace-building, 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 6, No 2 (2016) p. 176. © Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, 
Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo, available at:  
< www.dx.doi.org/10.21113/iir.v6i2.272 > (accessed 24 November 2018).  
35 Domestic policy of the Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece are linked to the 
Russian and China‘s intentions in condemning the Kosova’s independency because of their 
interethnic problems. 
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6. Kosova’s Security Forces and threatening by Serbia 
 
Within environment of military strengthening in the region, Kosovo 
decided to transform mandate of Kosova Security Forces, KSF. It was done 
by Kosova’s Parliament vote36, changing three Laws. US pushed in that 
direction as did Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France,…but, failing NATO 
unanimity.37 107 lawmakers present in Kosovo’s 120-seat Parliament, 
including minorities, formercept the Serbs, voted to back the government’s 
plan to transform the formeristing 3,000 lightly armed Kosovo Security 
Force into an army that would grow up to 5,000 active troops and 3,000 
reservists in the former decade. Knowing that, Serbia’s Prime Minister, Ana 
Brnabić, reacted hardly against Kosova’s movement38, attempting to further 
disperse voices within this regional security and political organization. 
Backed by Russia, Serbia requested an emergency United Nations Security 
Council session over “the grossest violation” of the resolution governing 
such a formation, said Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić.39 
Paradoxically, Serbia is going to invest more money equiping 30,000 troops 
army with modern weapon40, from Russia, six MiG-29 warplanes41 free of 
charge, 30 T-72S tanks, and 30 combat reconnaissance vehicles BRDM-2, 
                                                 
36 Barbara Surk (2018), Kosovo Parliament Votes to Create an Army, Defying Serbia and 
NATO, The New York Times, December 14, available at:  
< https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/world/europe/kosovo-army-serbia-nato.html > 
(accessed 04 December 2018). 
37 Kosovo legislature approves creation of national army (2018), DW, available at: < 
https://www.dw.com/en/kosovo-legislature-approves-creation-of-national-army/a-
46734640 > (accessed 04 December 2018). 
38 Serbia threatens military action after Kosovo votes to create army, (2018), Independent, 
available at: 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-army-security-force-
serbia-military-action-invasion-ana-brnabic-a8684861.html (accessed 14 November 2018).  
39 Surk (2018). 
40 SERBIAN SOLDIER OF THE 21ST CENTURY: Equipment coming for 1.500 elite soldiers, 
(2017) Telegraph, January, available at: < https://www.telegraf.rs/english/2580769-
serbian-soldier-of-the-21st-century-equipment-coming-for-1-500-elite-soldiers> (accessed 04 
December 2018) 
41 Julija Simić (2017), Secondhand Russian fighter jets arrive in Serbia, EURACTIV.rs, 
available at:  
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/secondhand-russian-fighter-
jets-arrive-in-serbia/> (accessed 04 December 2018). 
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with 14.5mm cannons42, but this is unacceptable when comes to 
strengthening Kosova’s forces, even incomparable forces to Serbian ones. 
According to them, Kosova doesn’t have right to protect it’s territory and 
people, justifying with the fact that the new country is not part of the UN, 
and according to UN SC Resolution 1244, but neglecting the reality that 
Kosova’s independence was in line with International Court of Justice. 
Kosova army is seeking be operational within a decade, mostly serving as 
part of NATO peacekeeping arrangements, as is will of Kosova’s 
population being part of NATO organization cupolas in the nformert 
future. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Contradictions within international community toward Kosova’s 
independence are damaging achieving peace within social misery 
mentalities in Serbia and Kosova. Challenges are of foreign and internal 
nature. Serbs and Albanians in Kosova can not move toward reconciliation 
by curbing each other's prospects and continuing believing in myths 
created on imaginations of dominance as the root cause of conflict. Practical 
step will be simultaneous integration into the EU. Initial integration of 
Serbia at EU, as carrot for recognizing Kosova, will cause certain 
international integration future problems for Kosova. Mutual recognition 
will solve century accumulated enemies and will open future integration 
development perspective for Kosovo and Serbia. Serbian false policy, 
transformed from Balkans black hole during the 90-ies to “moderated 
approach” with same wind political leaders, asking for reconciliation 
through compromise and consensus with Kosova is neither than 
prolonging of formeristing status quo. Kosova and Serbia have had chance 
to compromise with president Ahtisaari’s Plan, which was refused by the 
second one. Kosova is now at the last round of formerperiencing phase 
sovereignty and every return could reproduce interethnic violence. 
Tendencies for territorial corrections based on ethnicity line will postponed 
stabilization of the two countries and the region. Delays and uncertainties 
by the international community toward recognitions of Kosova’s 
independency may cause freezing and failure of peacebuilding process, 
                                                 
42 Serbia to get Russian warplanes, tanks, armored vehicles, (2016), b92, December available 
at:<https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=10
0019> (accessed 04 December 2018). 
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started almost e two decades ago, since withdrawals of Serbian forces from 
Kosova. The EU's decision-making in-dformerterity, isolating Kosovo 
people, contrary with their values, is creating more space for Russia's 
involvement in the Balkans. EU is failing to implement the will of majority 
member states on the Kosovo case. Failure of peace processes will be 
complementary to factorization of Russian policy of destabilization of the 
Balkan region and de-factorizing the role of western democracies and 
democracy as a system of governance. Internationally recognized 
independence of Kosova, becoming a member of international 
organizations, first of all at UN and EU, would be incentive for further 
perfection of the rule of law and democracy in order to reflect as peace 
producer at the region. Peace building in Kosova, as case of creation the 
new state, separated by Serbia, appeared to be different in nature and more 
complformer and difficult than the same process at the cases of intrastate 
conflict resolution. Because of sui generis nature, Kosova’s membership in 
regional and global international organizations needs special soft 
treatment, formercluding the rigorous treatment of admission conditions. 
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